Firm size and productivity from occupational choices by Medrano-Adán, L. et al.
1Firm size and productivity from occupational choices* 
Luis Medrano-Adán 
Centro Universitario de la Defensa (Zaragoza) 
lmedrano@unizar.es 
Vicente Salas-Fumás (+) 
vsalas@unizar.es 
University of Zaragoza 
J. Javier Sanchez-Asin 
jjsa@unizar.es 
University of Zaragoza 
Abstract 
We model the distributions of firm sizes and of firms’ total factor productivity (TFP) as 
outcomes of a market equilibrium from the occupational decisions of individuals with 
different entrepreneurial skills, of working as employees, employers or solo 
entrepreneurs. The model explains empirical regularities such as: i) the positive cross-
section correlation between average size of firms and average labor productivity of 
countries; ii) the positive association between size and TFP of firms in an economy; and 
iii) the power law distribution of firm sizes. Two parameters of the model, one that
measures the organizational size diseconomies, and other related to the dispersion of the 
distribution of entrepreneurial skills in the population, appear as main determinants of the 
differences in firm sizes and in productivity, across economies and among firms within 
an economy.  The results of the paper should be of interest for the design and evaluation 
of firm-size dependent policies. 
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21. INTRODUCTION
The explanation of why countries differ in per capita income, an indicator of the level of 
economic development, and the design of policies to close those gaps (convergence), are 
important topics in Economics. The evidence for a positive association between the 
average size of firms and the per capita income of countries has motivated national 
governments and international organizations (the OECD and the IMF) to establish and 
recommend policies aimed at removing obstacles to the growth of firms and to increase 
the average size of surviving firms, as a way to increase labor productivity and per capita 
income. In this respect, the OECD (2014) and the IMF (2015) reports on the Spanish 
economy both focus on the comparatively small size of Spanish firms as an explanation 
of the comparatively low productivity of the Spanish economy, seeking policy initiatives 
to increase the contribution of mid-sized and large firms to the GDP of Spain. 
This paper provides a theoretical framework, based on an extension of the original 
occupational choice models (Lucas, 1978, Jovanovic, 1994), for the study of the 
determinants of the organization of production, and how this organization determines the 
average labor productivity and output per capita of the economy. The extension includes, 
i) the introduction of a third occupational choice, the solo entrepreneur, to the original
two choices of employees and employers; and ii) the modeling of the internal organization 
of jobs and hierarchical levels of firms as part of the production technology. The 
organization of production in the economy goes beyond the number and size of firms, 
and includes the contributions of solo entrepreneurs to total employment and output, and 
the ways in which firms are internally managed and controlled. 
The relevance and contribution of the paper is justified, first, by the importance of firm-
size-dependent polices and of entrepreneurial enhancement policies of countries around 
the world, together with the limitations of the occupational choice models used to analyze 
and evaluate these policies, especially the exclusion of the occupational alternative of 
solo entrepreneurs. Second, the positive association between average size of firms and 
per capita income of countries (Bento and Restuccia, 2016) is not fully compatible with 
the findings of other research on a variety of non-linear relationships between 
entrepreneurship rates and income per capita of countries; relationships which are 
sometimes convex (Carree et al., 2002, 2007; Bosma et al., 2008; Gollin, 2008) and 
3sometimes concave (van Praag and van Stel, 2013). If each entrepreneur owns and 
manages one firm, then the proportion of entrepreneurs in all occupied individuals is an 
inverse measure of the average size of firms and, to be consistent with other empirical 
results, entrepreneurship rates should be negatively correlated with the per capita income 
of countries. Our results indicate that the relationship between entrepreneurship rates and 
per capita income can differ, depending on whether solo entrepreneurs are considered a 
separate group of the self-employed, or whether all self-employed, with and without 
employees, are considered as a homogeneous group. 
In terms of theory, the paper models the production function of firms as the aggregate 
output from production in jobs under the management and control of an entrepreneur of 
given entrepreneurial skills. From the production function and prices of inputs and output, 
we solve for the market equilibrium from income-maximizing occupational choices of 
individuals with different skills, working as employees, as solo self-employed, and as 
employer-managers. The market equilibrium gives the relative size of each occupational 
group and the distribution of firm sizes, for example in terms of the number of employees 
hired by each employer-manager and of the average size of all firms in the economy. 
Since the total number of persons occupied in the economy is given (normalized to one 
in the model), the total output produced is a measure of labor productivity i.e. output per 
occupied individual. The first result of the paper is that entrepreneurship rates (the self-
employed, with and without employees), the average size of firms, and output per capita 
are all endogenous variables jointly determined in the market equilibrium. No causal 
relationship between entrepreneurship rates and average size of firms, and labor 
productivity can exist; all the endogenous variables are determined by the values of the 
exogenous parameters, and it is the differences in these parameters that explain 
differences in size and productivity. 
After the characterization of the equilibrium we conduct comparative static around the 
market equilibrium solution, i.e. how the relevant endogenous variables of the model 
distribution of firm size, entrepreneurship rates, total output produced – respond to 
changes in the exogenous parameters, organizational size diseconomies and capital 
intensity of the production technology, cost of capital, dispersion of entrepreneurial skills 
in the population, etc. We find that equilibrium sizes of firms, total output, sizes of 
occupational groups, are highly sensible to differences in the values of parameters on 
4organizational size diseconomies and dispersion of the distribution of skills. In fact, for 
those two exogenous parameters, and for practically all the rest, changes in their values 
imply that the equilibrium average size of firms and labor productivity of the whole 
economy both change in the same direction. Therefore, we can trace the empirical 
regularity on size of firms positively correlated with per capita income of countries to 
cross country differences in the values of the parameters of the model. 
Next, we calibrate the parameters of the model with Spanish data on the sizes of 
occupational groups and provide a validation of the model, comparing the predicted 
number of firms and occupied individuals across different size classes, with the observed 
ones. We find that the calibrated model can explain reasonably well the observed 
distribution of firm size in Spain. Thus, we confirm the validity of occupational choice 
models to explain and understand why the size distribution of firms differs across 
countries. Then, we focus on the factors that may condition the current comparatively low 
productivity and small sizes of Spanish firms, and provide hints for future policy 
initiatives. In this respect, in the context of the model, greater organizational size 
diseconomies (from lower delegation of decision power over direct workers by 
entrepreneurs), and lower dispersion of skills in the working population in Spain, 
compared to the US, can explain differences in average size of firms and productivity 
between the two countries. This result can be generalized to explain the observed cross-
section correlation between average size of firms and per capita income of countries 
(Bento and Restuccia, 2016). 
Finally, we show that the distribution of TFP of firms in an economy is a monotonic 
transformation of the distribution of entrepreneurial skills in the occupational group of 
employers-managers. Since the model also predicts that, in the occupational choice 
equilibrium, entrepreneurs that are more skilled will manage larger firms, we provide an 
explanation of the empirically observed positive correlation between size and TFP of 
firms (Idson and Oi, 1999; Hsieh and Klenov, 2009, 2014; Syverson, 2011). In addition, 
we find that the distribution of firm sizes is simply a power transformation of the 
truncated distribution of entrepreneurial skills, with lower bound in the number of 
employees equal to that employed by the entrepreneur with skills that make her 
indifferent between working as solo self-employed or as employer-manager. This result 
is important in clarifying when and why the values of the variable size of firms follow a 
5power law distribution (Axtell, 2001; Gabaix, 2016), as well as in clarifying the origin of 
the “missing middle” (Hsieh and Olken, 2014), and whether or not it is relevant to the 
design of firm-size dependent policies. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a review of the related 
literature and highlights the contribution of the paper to the literature on occupational 
choice. Section 3 presents the basic elements of the theoretical model, particularly the 
production function of solo entrepreneurs and employers, together with the 
characterization of the market equilibrium with three occupational choices. Section 4 
shows the results of the calibration of the parameters of the model, the comparison of 
predicted and observed distribution of firm sizes in Spain, and some comparative static 
results. Section 5 presents additional extensions of the properties of the market 
equilibrium to explain other regularities around the relationship between size of firms and 
productivity of the economy. The conclusion section discusses our main results in the 
context of the literature. 
2. RELATED LITERATURE AND EXTENSIONS OF THE OCCUPATIONAL
CHOICE MODELS 
Lucas (1978) was the first to establish a relationship between the size of firms and the per 
capita income of economies, from occupational choice models: in economies where the 
elasticity of substitution between labor and capital in production is lower than one, greater 
capital deepening will increase both the average size of firms and average labor 
productivity. Therefore, in a cross/section of countries with different levels of capital, a 
positive association is expected between per capita income and the average size of firms. 
Lucas argues that, since it can reasonably be expected that the US economy will increase 
capital intensity over time, the relative share of output from large firms and the average 
labor productivity will both increase over time too. 
However, the empirical evidence indicates that the relative importance of small and large 
firms does not show a linear trend over time, and that countries with similar economic 
development continue to have permanent differences in entrepreneurship rates. This 
means that the stock of capital is not the only driver of the association between size of 
firms and productivity. Furthermore, Lucas (1978) and other early occupational choice 
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models ignore the solo self-employed as a third occupational choice (Salas-Fumás et al., 
2014), and also overlook the importance of how firms organize internally - for example, 
their span of control and hierarchical levels (Penrose, 1959; Calvo and Wellisz, 1980; 
Rosen, 1982), as determinants of the limits to the growth of the firms. This paper extends 
Lucas’ model to include the occupational choice of solo entrepreneurs and explicitly 
model the organization of production and control within firms. 
 
Following the literature, the quality of strategic decisions is part of the total factor 
productivity component of the production technology (better or worse decisions affect 
the productivity of all resource inputs). However, the supervision input is allocated across 
individuals at lower levels of the hierarchy, and its contribution to produced output is 
affected by decreasing returns to scale. This means, in the context of the model, that a 
production function with constant technological returns to scale becomes a production 
function with decreasing returns, due to the internal costs of growth resulting from agency 
costs and loss of control in hierarchical organizations (Penrose, 1959; Calvo and Wellisz, 
1980). The fact that the limits to the size and growth of firms have to do with management 
costs in hierarchical organization structures, explains why the paper refers to decreasing 
returns to scale in production as organizational size diseconomies. 
 
The number of solo self-employed individuals is relatively high in many economies (in 
Spain, they represent around 12.5% of all occupied persons in the market economy - with 
the exclusion of agriculture - twice the proportion of employers) and the size distribution 
of firms will be incomplete if solo self-employment is omitted from the analysis. 
Moreover, the negative association between per capita income of countries and 
entrepreneurship-self-employment rates, observed when all self-employed are considered 
as a homogeneous group (Blanchflower, 2004; Gollin, 2008), changes when self-
employment is split into solo entrepreneurs and employers, so that it applies only to the 
rate of solo entrepreneurs (Salas-Fumás et al., 2014). The explanation of the distribution 
of firm sizes separating firms with and without employees, contributes to a better 
understanding of why some entrepreneurs contribute more than others do to output and 
the productivity of the whole economy (Shane, 2009; Parker, 2009). 
 
Another line of research empirically attributes national differences in firm sizes to 
differences in the economic and institutional environment: taxes, employment laws, 
7regulation of financial markets, and the size of the public sector (Blau, 1987; Davis and 
Henrekson, 1999; Henrekson and Johansson, 1999). The recommendations of public 
policies to increase the size of firms in Spain as a way to increase productivity, by the 
OECD (2014) and the IMF (2015), assume that some size-dependent economic policies 
(for example that firms with 50 employees or higher must create workers councils) affect 
the size distribution of firms. Other papers follow research into distortions in the 
allocation of resources from firm-size dependent public policies (Restuccia and 
Rogerson, 2008; Guner et al., 2008). They include, Onji (2009) for Japan, Schivardi and 
Torrini (2008) for Italy, Garicano et al. (2016) for France, and Branstetter et al. (2014) 
for Portugal. This paper shows that cross-country differences in the average size of firms 
and in labor productivity can occur, even among free-market economies, when economies 
differ in the distribution of entrepreneurial skills, production technology, and 
management of firms. 
3. THE PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY AND MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
This section describes the joint production involving direct labor, capital services, and 
inputs from entrepreneurs, together with the market equilibrium from occupational choice 
of individuals who differ in their entrepreneurial skills1. 
3.1. Production function 
The basic production unit is a job position. Jobs can operate independently, occupied by 
a solo entrepreneur, or they can be grouped in firms under the hierarchical direction of an 
entrepreneur-manager. In the economy, there is only one final good with selling price 
normalized to one by assumption. The production of the final good requires three inputs 
supplied by the employees, the capital, and the entrepreneur. 
As in Lucas (1978) and Rosen (1982), inputs from the entrepreneur enter into the 
production function together with capital and direct labor. Obtaining the final output 
1 The model assumes complete and symmetric information. The occupation choice between entrepreneurs 
and employees has also been explained by the different degree of risk aversion of individuals and uncertain 
pay-offs from entrepreneurship (Khilstrom and Laffont, 1979). When individuals learn their entrepreneurial 
skills from experience, then the occupational choice equilibrium is the convergence point of a dynamic 
process (Jovanovic, 1982; Hopenhayn, 1992). 
8involves a three-stage process: first, we define an intermediate output at the job level by 
simply combining labor and capital inputs; next, we combine the intermediate output with 
the input of the entrepreneur-manager to obtain the level of final output of one job 
position; and finally, we solve for the output-maximizing number of jobs, to be 
aggregated under the direction of an entrepreneur of given skills. 
The production technology in job j gives the level of intermediate output jy  as a function 
of quantities of labor and capital inputs, jl and jk respectively. The corresponding 
production function, the same for all jobs, is a constant elasticity of substitution, CES, 
function, 
  (1) 
The parameter 0 <  < 1 determines the relative labor intensity of the production 
technology, and ρ determines the value of the constant elasticity of substitution, 
σ = 1/(1 + ρ) with −1 < ρ. For ρ = 0, the CES converges to the Cobb Douglas (σ = 1) 
production function. 
The intermediate output, yj, is combined with the inputs from the entrepreneur of given 
skills to be converted into final output. As in Rosen (1982), the entrepreneur contributes 
in two ways, making the strategic decisions on what to produce and how, and assuring 
the proper implementation of decisions. The input from the strategic decision is shared 
by all jobs in the organization, in the sense that the quality of the decision will affect the 
productivity of all the resources under the direction of the entrepreneur. The 
implementation of the strategic decision will require the supervision and/or problem-
solving support of the entrepreneur, on a job-by-job basis. We define by e, positive, the 
level of skills of the entrepreneur, directly related to the quality of the decision, and by 
jet the skills-weighted working time of the entrepreneur allocated to job position j. The 
final output produced in job j, jY , with the combination of the intermediate output and 
the entrepreneurs’ inputs, is given by: 
  (2) 
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9The term θ is a positive parameter that captures the level of productivity of the economy, 
common to all jobs and production units. The function  g e , increasing in e, captures 
the contribution to output from the quality of the strategic decisions of the entrepreneur. 
Function (2) is linear homogeneous in the management input, etj, and the intermediate 
output jy . The parameter 0 < β < 1 captures the relative intensity of the skills-weighted 
time of the entrepreneur in the production of job j. We assume that the parameter β 
captures characteristics of the internal organization and management of firms. For 
example, higher (lower) centralization and involvement of the entrepreneur in the 
implementation stage will be associated with higher (lower) values of β. There is 
empirical evidence that delegation of decision power is higher in firms of countries with 
higher levels of generalized trust (Gur and Bjornskov, 2016), which is interpreted as 
evidence that trust reduces agency and control costs in hierarchical organizations. 
Therefore, the value of parameter β is expected to vary inversely with the levels of 
generalized trust in the economy2. 
The labor input per job jl is fixed. The entrepreneur of skills e is endowed with K units 
of capital and T units of working time and decides how to allocate the two inputs in the 
M ≥ 2 jobs. All the jobs under the direction of an entrepreneur of skills e will benefit 
equally from the quality of the strategic decisions, so the term ( )g e  will be an input in 
the M jobs. The entrepreneur allocates working time and capital endowment so that total 
output produced is maximized: 
From the linear homogeneous property of the job production functions of the intermediate 
output, equation (1), and final output, equation (2), the optimal solution implies: 
2  In Garicano (2000) and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) entrepreneur-managers contribute to 
production using their specialized knowledge to help employees solve complex problems. In the market 
equilibrium, there is an optimal matching of employees and managers, while in Rosen (1982) all employees 
can be perfectly exchanged among employers. 
     1,
subje
( ) 1
,ct to
Max M Mj j j j
j j
M M
j j
j j
j jt k
Y g e et l k
t T k K
     
 
     
 
 
 
10
1
M
jj j
M
j jj
kk K d
l Ll
   (Constant) (3) 
2
M
jj j
M
j jj
tt T d
l Ll
   (Constant) (4) 
If the working time of employees and entrepreneur is normalized to 1, then T = 1 and the 
input from employees, L, is equal to the number of employees (each contributing with 
one unit of input). Substituting (3) and (4) in the production function and with 
T = 1, the total output produced by an entrepreneur of skills e is given by: 
(5) 
For values of 1 > β > 0, the production function at the firm level has decreasing returns 
to scale (recall that the skills of the entrepreneur e are fixed). The diseconomies in the 
quantities of number of employees and capital inputs employed in production increase 
with the value of the parameter β, that in turn depends ultimately on how firms are 
organized and managed internally. To differentiate these scale diseconomies from pure 
technological ones (the technology at the job level has constant returns to scale to labor 
and capital), we will interpret higher values of β as an indicator of higher organizational 
size diseconomies. 
3.2. Solo entrepreneurs 
The solo entrepreneurs occupy jobs where production is the result of combining their own 
skills together with purchased capital input services and fixed working time. The solo 
entrepreneur makes the strategic decisions and contributes to production at the job level 
with a fixed quantity of labor input jl that will also be normalized to one. Since the solo 
entrepreneurs do not hire employees, then no hierarchical structure is needed to control 
production (β = 0). From (1), the production function of the solo entrepreneur with skills 
e is given by: 
   1( ) 1Y g e e L K             
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  (6) 
where jsY is the output and h(e), positive and increasing function of skills, is the 
contribution to output of the quality of the entrepreneurial decision, similar to g(e) in the 
production function of entrepreneurs who hire employees. 
3.3. Related literature 
In Lucas (1978), each direct employee supplies one unit of working time, 1jl  . 
Therefore, L is also the number of employees under the direction of the entrepreneur of 
skills e. Lucas ignores the internal organization of work within the firm (i.e. makes β = 
0). The condition of decreasing returns to scale needed to obtain a finite solution in the 
output of firms is imposed exogenously and the production function is written as 
, where 0 < τ < 1 is the parameter that determines, inversely, the 
degree of decreasing returns to scale. 
Rosen (1982) considers that individuals are endowed with a general skill q that is used 
either in entrepreneurial or operational tasks. If one unit of general skill is equivalent to 
one unit of operational skill, and the working time is normalized to one, then the labor 
input supplied by L employees, each endowed with qj units of general skill, is . 
Then, the sum of operational skills, Q, would replace the number of employees, L, in the 
production function (6), although Rosen does not include capital as a productive input. 
Throughout this paper, we assume that all individuals are endowed with one unit of 
operational skill and they differ only in entrepreneurial skills. 
In Gollin (2008), the production technologies of both entrepreneur-managers and solo 
entrepreneurs have decreasing returns to scale and the entrepreneurial skills enter into the 
production function as in Lucas (1978), i.e. the internal organization of firms is not part 
of the model. In the equilibrium, the solo entrepreneur works part-time as solo self-
employed and part-time as employee. However, in the empirical analysis, all self-
employed are treated as a homogeneous group. In Guner et al. (2008), there are only 
  1( ) 1js j jY h e l k          
   ;Y g e F L K    
L
j
j
Q q 
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entrepreneur-managers and employees, and the production function is of the Cobb 
Douglas type. They assume that the production function is linear homogeneous in skills 
e and the output from the combination of labor and capital; the function resembles 
equation (6) but with elasticity of substitution equal to one and  g e  = 1. 
In sum, although there are similarities between our production function at the firm level 
and other production functions in the literature inspired by Lucas (1978), a distinct feature 
of this paper is that diseconomies of scale in quantities of capital and direct labor inputs 
are attributed to the way firms are internally organized and managed and, more 
specifically, to the time entrepreneurs employ in implementing the strategic decisions. 
3.4. Individuals, skills, and pay-offs from occupational decisions 
The economy has a fixed total number of individuals, normalized to one with individuals 
on the continuum of points from zero to one, endowed with one unit of operational skill 
and a different level of entrepreneurial skill e. The distribution of entrepreneurial skills in 
the population is assumed to follow a Pareto distribution, whit cumulative distribution 
function  e , 
for (7) 
where b is the lower bound of the distribution and a is a parameter that determines the 
coefficient of variation (inversely),   1/ 22a aCV     . Given b, the lower the value of 
a, the heavier the upper tail of the distribution and the higher the mean, the variance and 
the coefficient of variation. The Pareto distribution has the properties that the larger 
fraction of individuals concentrates at the lower end of the distribution, and the 
probability density function is strictly decreasing and convex in e. But maybe its most 
distinctive feature is that its survival and density probability functions are isoelastic, with 
elasticities equal to a and a) respectively. 
  1 abe
e
     0e b 
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Lucas assumed a Pareto distribution of skills in his original paper. The Pareto distribution 
imposes asymmetry on the distribution of skills but, as will be evident later, the 
asymmetry of the distributions of the relevant size of the firm variables, number of 
employees, output, capital stock, is determined by other factors in addition to the 
asymmetry of the distribution of skills. 
Individuals choose an occupation, to work as employees, to work as solo entrepreneurs, 
or to work as entrepreneur-managers, i.e. self-employed that hire employees. The choice 
responds to the criteria of maximizing income. We assume that there is perfect supply of 
capital services at a market cost of capital3, c. The supply of employees is equal to the 
total population minus the number of individuals who choose to be entrepreneurs. The 
demand for employees comes from the entrepreneur-managers. A market-determined 
salary for employees, w, will balance demand and supply. To save in notation, throughout 
the paper we assume  h e = g(e) = e. 
An employee earns the market salary w, independently of his/her level of entrepreneurial 
skills. The income of the entrepreneur is the profit from production and sales, which 
depends on the entrepreneurial skills. The net income of the solo entrepreneur with skills 
e,  R e , is given by (the direct labor of the self-employed is 1, the same as of any 
employee): 
The optimal solution to this problem gives: 
     
11
1 1* 1111
1
s
e
Y e e
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 (8) 
3 In Lucas (1978) the cost of capital c is equal to the shadow price of the constraint on total capital available. 
Rosen (1982) does not include capital as a production input. Other papers, Gollin (2008) and Guner et al. 
(2008), solve endogenously for the discount factor in a market equilibrium where consumers make saving 
decisions and producers make investment decision. We assume that financial markets optimally separate 
consumption from production decisions, and the users’ cost of capital is the slope of the separating line. 
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 (9) 
Similarly, the income-profit of the entrepreneur-manager with skill e is equal to: 
From the first order conditions, the demands for labor and capital by the entrepreneur-
manager of skill e are, 
     
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The optimal output and profits are: 
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3.5. Market equilibrium 
In a decentralized market economy, individuals make occupational choices, comparing 
the pay-offs of the occupation alternatives at given market prices until the equilibrium is 
reached. Since the price of capital services is given, the market price to solve for in the 
equilibrium is the employees’ salary, w. The equilibrium must satisfy two conditions: 
first, there is a salary for which the supply of employees is equal to the demand by 
employers; and, second, no individual will want to change occupation. The second 
condition will be satisfied if an individual with given entrepreneurial skills earns higher 
income in the occupation that is part of the equilibrium than in any other. 
     
11
1 11 11 1R e e c
    
             
    1, 1MaxK Le e Le K KL w c     

        
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The market equilibrium allocates individuals to the three occupational groups. The 
market salary of employees is independent of the level of entrepreneurial skills of the 
employee, while incomes of solo entrepreneurs (9) and of entrepreneur-managers (11) are 
both increasing and convex functions of skills. From the properties of the salary and profit 
functions, in the market equilibrium, the profits of solo entrepreneurs and of entrepreneur-
managers will both intersect the salary function from below. Moreover, in the equilibrium 
with non-empty groups of employees, solo entrepreneurs, and entrepreneur-managers, the 
differences in convexity with skills of profits of the two types of entrepreneur imply that 
there will be a level of skill where the profit function of entrepreneur-managers will 
intersect from below the profit function of the solo self-employed (see figure 1). From 
these properties of the income functions, and with the condition that the supply of 
employees equals demand, the market equilibrium is determined by the values of skills 
e1 < e2 that satisfy the conditions: 
 (12) 
(13) 
     1
2
* *,
e
b e
d e L e w d e

    (14) 
where w* is the salary for which the supply of employees equals the demand. Individuals 
with entrepreneurial skills in the interval b ≤ e ≤ e1 work as employees; those with skills 
in the interval e1 ≤ e ≤ e2 work as solo entrepreneurs; and those with skills e ≥ e2 will be 
employers-managers. 
The equations (12) to (14), after substituting  R e ,  e , and  * ,L e w  given by (9), 
(11) and (10) respectively, appear written in detail in Appendix A. A necessary condition 
for a finite demand for employees is that β (a  1) > 1. If this condition holds, then we 
can prove that the equilibrium exists and is unique 4 . Figure 1 shows the market 
4 The proof is not reported to save space but is available from the authors on request. 
 1 *R e w
   2 2e R e 
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equilibrium solution for values of the parameters of the model calibrated in the following 
section with Spanish data. 
(FIGURE 1) 
The figure on the left shows the representation of the salary of employees, net income of 
the solo entrepreneurs, and profits of entrepreneurs-managers, for the equilibrium salary 
w*. The intersections of these functions determine the equilibrium relative numbers of 
individuals in each occupational group: individuals with lower entrepreneurial skills (e < 
e1 with e1 = 4.53, for the selected parameter values) work as employees; those with 
intermediate skills (e1 ≤ e < e2 with e2 = 5.48) are solo entrepreneurs, and those with 
higher entrepreneurial skills (e  e2) are entrepreneurs-managers. The figure on the right 
shows the demand and supply of employees as a function of the salary. The intersection 
determines the values (L*, w*), where w* = 5.52 is the market-clearing salary and L* = 
0.79 is the equilibrium proportion of individuals working as employees (also equal to the 
aggregate labor demand of the employers). 
More formally, the results from the market equilibrium are summarized in Result 1 as 
follows: 
Result 1. In the market equilibrium from equations (12), (13) and (14), with 
functions  R e ,  e , and L*(e) given by equations (9), (11) and (10) and a 
Pareto distribution of entrepreneurial skills, the following holds: 
a) There will be  1
1
1
a
be
e
      
employees,    1 2
1 2
a a
b be e
e e
             
solo entrepreneurs, and    2 21 ae b e    entrepreneurs-managers. The total 
output, TYT*, is equal to the sum of output produced by the firms with 
employees, TY*, and the output produced by the solo entrepreneurs, TYs*: 
       2
2 1
* * * * * *;
e
T s s
e e
TY TY TY Y e w d e Y e d e

       , where  * *,Y e w  is
given by equation (10),  *sY e by equation (11), and w* is the equilibrium 
salary. 

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b) The distribution of firm size, with size measured by number of employees, i.e.
the proportion of firms with employees less than or equal to L, for
, is given by 
 (15) 
where 
. 
c) The proportion of employees in firms with size less than or equal to L
employees, for  is given by 
(16)  
d) The proportion of firms,  % firms L , as a function of the proportion of
employees in these firms,  % emplyoees L , is given by
The average size, number of employees, of firms with employees, ASF, is 
   
 
 
 
2
* *
1*
2 2
, 1 ae
a a
L e w d e
b e
ASF
b e b e

  

(17) 
e) The distribution of TFP of firms with employees is a Pareto distribution with
parameters  2 ,e a , so that, its cumulative distribution function is  given by
2
2( ) 1 for   
aeH x x e
x
       (18) 
Explanation: distribution of firm size 
 * *min 2 ,L L L e w 
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
     
     
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  
   
             
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Result 1.a) describes the mapping between the distribution of skills and the relative size 
of each occupational group (employees, solo entrepreneurs, and employers) in the market 
equilibrium. It also gives the total output produced in the market equilibrium, equal to the 
sum of the output of firms with employees and the output of solo entrepreneurs. Since the 
number of occupied individuals is normalized to one, the total output produced is also the 
output produced per occupied individual, i.e., the average labor productivity of the 
economy in the market equilibrium. 
Results 1.b) and 1.c) imply that, in the equilibrium, the distribution of firm size and the 
distribution of employees in firms of different sizes, are Pareto distributions. The 
minimum firm size, number of employees, minL , is that of the firm managed by the less-
skilled employer in both cases, while the power parameters are, respectively, 1
a 
  and 
 1 1 11 1
a a 
 
     . Since the value of the power parameter of the distribution of 
firm size, 1
a 
 , is greater than the value of the power parameter of the distribution of 
employees across firm sizes,  1 11
a

 
 , the size distribution of firms will show a 
greater concentration across firm sizes than the distribution of employees. 
In fact, the cumulative distribution function of employees in firms of different sizes, 
(Result 1.d) is an increasing and concave function of the cumulative distribution function 
of firm sizes, and the curvature and the slope of this function depends only on parameter 
a, related to the dispersion of skills in the population, and on parameter β, the measure of 
organizational size diseconomies. The two parameters determine the slope of the 
distribution of firm size in the economy, so that higher (lower) values of this slope imply 
more (less) firms concentrated in the lower size classes and, therefore, a smaller (larger) 
average size of firms with employees, for a given minimum size minL . The average size 
in number of employees of firms with employees is given by equation (17). 
The distribution of firm sizes for firms that hire employees along the dimension of number 
of employees, L, is defined from the lower bound of number of employees, Lmin that 
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corresponds to the size of the firm managed by an entrepreneur with skills e2. Then, there 
is a one-to-one correspondence between the number of employees of the firm, L ≥ Lmin, 
and the skill of the entrepreneur who manages the firm, e ≥ e2. In fact, from equation (10), 
the distribution of firm sizes (15) is the power transformation  * *,L e w  of the left-
truncated distribution of skills, defined for skill (size) values e ≥ e2 (L ≥ Lmin). 
 
Explanation: distribution of TFP 
 
From equation (6), the production function of the firm managed by an entrepreneur with 
skills e is given by       11Y g e eT L K              . There are three inputs that 
directly contribute to the total output produced: skill-weighted working time of the 
entrepreneur, eT , with T = 1 by assumption, direct labor, L, and capital, K. The TFP of 
the firm is equal to the ratio between output Y and the contribution to this output from 
the three direct labor inputs:  
 
   
 1
1
YTFP g e
e L K

   

 
 
 
 
   
 
 
The parameter θ is common to all firms and represents the general stage of development 
of the economy. The function g(e), increasing with entrepreneurial skills e, is the 
contribution to output attributed to the quality of the decisions of the entrepreneur that 
leverages the productivity of direct inputs in all job positions. 
 
Results 1.e) means that the distribution of TFP of firms is an increasing monotone 
transformation,  g(e), of the left-truncated distribution of entrepreneurial skills in the 
population, truncated at e2.  
 
Since θ is the same for all firms in the economy, differences in TFP across firms will only 
depend on  g e . Throughout the paper, we assume that θ = 1 and  g e  = e; so, under 
this assumption, the distribution of TFP of production units in the economy will coincide 
with the distribution of skills of their respective entrepreneurs, as represented by equation 
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(18) with θ = 1. In the range of skills e1 ≤ e < e2 the distribution of skills and TFP will be 
that of the solo entrepreneurs, while for skills e2 ≤ e the distribution of TFP of firms will 
be the distribution of skills of their entrepreneurs-managers5. 
 
4. CALIBRATION OF THE PARAMETERS OF THE MODEL AND 
COMPARATIVE STATIC ANALYSIS 
 
The market equilibrium from occupational choices does not have a closed solution. In 
this section, we calibrate the values of the parameters with data from sizes of occupational 
groups in Spain, and use the values to validate the model, comparing predicted 
distributions with the observed ones, and to explain differences in the average size of 
firms and average productivity of Spain relative to other countries, particularly the US. 
 
4.1. Calibration of the parameters 
 
The list of parameters for the calibration includes: the general TFP, θ; the user cost of 
capital, c; the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital in the production 
function, σ = 1/ (1+ρ); the relative labor intensity of the production technology, µ; the 
organizational size diseconomies, β; and the parameters a and b of the Pareto distribution 
of skills.  
 
The value of θ is normalized to 1. The user cost of capital c is set to 12% (4% of the 
financial cost of capital and 8% of the depreciation rate). The 4% is the average real cost 
of debt for Spanish non-financial corporations in the last ten years, and the depreciation 
rate of 8% is the ten-year average of the ratio between amortization allowances and gross 
tangible assets (Banco de España, 2014). The parameters of relative intensity of labor 
input in production, μ, and of the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital σ, 
are set to μ = 0.75 and σ = 2/3 (ρ = 0.5), similar to those calibrated for other developed 
countries (Guner et al., 2008; Gollin, 2008). 
 
                                                        
5 In general, if  ≠ 1 and g(e) ≠ e, the distribution of TFP will be an increasing non-linear 
transformation of the left-truncated distribution of entrepreneurial skills. 
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We are left with three parameters β, a, and b. In the calibration of these parameters, we 
use real data on the sizes of occupational groups, and on the proportion of individuals 
occupied in large firms in Spain. Thus, we avoid using actual data on the distribution of 
firm sizes. The absolute and relative sizes of occupational groups in Spain are reported in 
Table 1, for years 2005 (expansion period) and 2013 (contraction period). The numbers 
of total occupied in the table include only those working in the non-agricultural market 
sector of the economy (therefore, all public employees and those occupied in agriculture 
are excluded). The column of “employees” excludes those occupied in general 
management positions that official statistics include as salaried employers, but that we 
report in Table 1 in the separate column of “managers”. We do so because general 
managers perform entrepreneurial functions similar to those of employers and business 
owners, different from those performed by the direct employees. 
 
(TABLE 1) 
 
According to the values in Table 1, the proportions of employees, employers plus 
managers, and of solo self-employed over all occupied individuals in the market economy 
in Spain are set equal to 0.79, 0.085, and 0.125, respectively. If there is one entrepreneur 
per production unit, then these proportions imply that, of the total number of units, with 
and without employees, almost 60% (0.125/0.21) do not have employees. 
 
Since the three proportions of individuals in occupation groups add to one, in the 
calibration we can only use two of them. The third observed data value needed to calibrate 
the three remaining parameters is taken from OECD (2014) data on the proportion of 
occupied individuals in firms with 250 or more employees. For Spain, this proportion is 
24% of all those occupied in firms with employees in 2009, the first year available, and 
26% in 2013, the last year available. Therefore, the value of 0.25 for the proportion of 
individuals occupied in large firms is a reasonable reference for completing the 
calibration. 
 
According to Result 1.a) above, the proportion of employees in the equilibrium is given 
by  1e =  11 ab e , and the proportion of employer-managers by    2 21 ae b e   . 
The proportion of individuals occupied in firms with 250 or more employees is a weighted 
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average of the proportions of employer-managers and employees in firms of that size, 
which, from Results 1.a) and 1.b), are given by  1min 250 aL   and    1 11min 250 aL   
respectively. The three equations with real data on sizes of occupational groups and 
employment in large firms, used in the calibration exercise, are then formulated as 
follows: 
 
 
The values of e1, e2 and minL  in these equations must satisfy the market equilibrium 
conditions summarized in equations (12) to (14), which will also be part of the calculation 
of the equilibrium. Altogether, we have a system of six equations that must be solved 
numerically to obtain the values of the three parameters, a, b, and β. Appendix B shows 
the full set of equations and provides some additional technical details of the calculations. 
The results of the calibration give a = 4.78, b = 3.27, and β = 0.36; together with e1 = 
4.53, e2 = 5.48, and minL  = 1.94. The list of parameter values is completed with c = 0.12, 
θ = 1, μ = 0.75 and ρ = 0.5. 
Robustness 
There are two parameters, μ and ρ, whose values have not been directly calibrated from 
observed data and taken from the results of calibrations with data from other countries. 
For robustness purposes, we examine the range of values of the parameters for which, 
keeping the other parameters constant, the proportions of the occupied in each 
occupational group in the new market equilibrium are close to the observed ones in Table 
1. When μ is reduced from 0.75 in the base scenario to 0.70, i.e. more capital-intensive
technology, keeping the remaining parameters at their base values, the equilibrium 
 1
1
1 0.79
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
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 
          
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occupation rates are 7.9% employers and 16% solo entrepreneurs, compared with the 
observed 8.5% and 12.5%, respectively (Table 1). More capital-intensive production 
technology increases the net income of the solo entrepreneurs more than do employers’ 
profits, because the former have a limited amount of direct labor input available. 
 
Additionally, we recalibrate the values of parameters a and b with μ = 0.7, keeping the 
rates of employers and solo entrepreneurs equal to those observed in the economy. We 
find that the observed occupational rates can be replicated in the base model by simply 
changing the minimum value of the distribution of skills, from b = 3.27 to 3.62 and 
keeping a and β unchanged. Except for modest changes in the number of solo 
entrepreneurs, the results of the calibration can be considered reasonably robust for values 
of μ in the range between 0.7 and 0.75. 
 
Lower values of ρ, so that the elasticity of substitution approaches one (the Cobb 
Douglass production function), produce effects similar to reducing μ: the number of solo 
entrepreneurs increases and the number of employer-managers decreases. Greater 
elasticity of substitution increases the income of solo entrepreneurs. Since their labor 
input is fixed, greater elasticity of substitution allows for the use of more capital input in 
production and increases the output. In the range of values of  between the base case 
0.67 and 1, keeping the remaining parameters unchanged, the only endogenous variable 
sensitive to the value of the elasticity of substitution is again the number of solo 
entrepreneurs. For values of the elasticity of substitution above 1, the fit to the observed 
number of solo entrepreneurs and employer-managers would require a recalibration of 
the values of parameters a and b. 
 
4.2. Comparison with observed distributions of firm sizes and occupied individuals 
 
Table 2 presents the distributions of firm size and the occupied in these firms, both 
observed and predicted from the model. The size classes, in number of employees, are 
defined as they appear in the official statistics: micro (1-9), small (10-49), medium (50-
249) and large (>250). 
 
(TABLE 2) 
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The large majority of Spanish firms with employees, up to 90.7% in 2013, have fewer 
than 9 employees (micro firms). Only 1.56% of the firms with employees have 50 or more 
employees in that year. The distribution of occupied individuals in size classes of firms 
is more homogeneous than that of number of firms, but differences persist; the size classes 
of firms with higher proportion of the occupied are the micro, 40.7%, and large, 26.16%, 
and the lowest the medium with 13.51%. The average number of the occupied per firm 
with employees is around 8. These patterns in the distribution of firms and occupied 
individuals in firm size classes are found in all OECD countries (OECD, 2014), but the 
Southern European countries, Spain, Italy, and Greece, are among the countries with 
higher proportions of micro and small firms and smaller average size of firms with 
employees. In Germany, for example, 3% of firms have 50 or more employees and 
constitute 57% of the occupied; the average size of firms is more than twice that of 
Spanish firms. Axtell (2001) reports an average size of firms with employees of 22 for 
the US. 
The distributions of firm sizes and employees in these firms vary over time. In the 
expansion year (2005), the proportions of firms in the size classes of 50 or more 
employees are higher than in 2013, at the peak of the crisis. The proportion of individuals 
occupied in the largest size firms increases as the crisis advances (from 2009 to 2013). In 
periods of expansion, the growth of small firms takes place to a greater extent by hiring 
employees than by increasing the number of firms. In periods of crisis, the reverse appears 
to occur, the loss of employees in small firms is higher than the contraction in the number 
of small firms. The numbers of medium and large firms decline by proportionally more 
in the crisis, but the remaining firms reduce employment by a lesser amount than the 
employment lost in small firms. 
The comparison of predicted and observed distributions of firm sizes and occupied 
individuals confirms that the model can explain the Spanish data on firm sizes and sizes 
of occupational groups reasonably well. Notice that, in the calibration, we only use one 
data point of the distribution of employees in firms of the different size classes 
(employees in firms with 250 employees or more). Moreover, the number of firms with 
employees (approximately 1.5 million) reported in Table 2 is higher than the sum of 
managers and employers (approximately equal to 1.2 million), reported in Table 1, 
because there are employers-business owners with more than one firm. In the calibration 
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of the parameters, we use data from Table 1 because the model explains occupational 
choices, not the decision on the number of firms-legal entities with which to conduct the 
businesses. This difference in the number of firms, legal entities, and entrepreneur-
managers, will be reflected in certain discrepancies between the observed and predicted 
proportions of firms in Table 2. 
5. COMPARATIVE STATIC ANALYSIS
There are three main empirical regularities that the occupational choice model presented 
here can help us to understand: i) the cross-countries positive correlation between average 
size of firms and per capita income; ii), the evidence that the TFP of firms increases with 
their size; and iii) the inclusion of size of firms among the economic variables that follow 
a power law. In terms of the variables of the model, the first piece of empirical evidence 
refers to the correlation between the average size of firms with employees, ASF, in Result 
1.d), equation (17), and total output produced, TY*T. The second piece of evidence implies 
that the TFP value,  g e = e , for skills, e ≥ e2, increases with L, the size of the firm
for L ≥ Lmin. Finally, the properties of the distribution of firm sizes, and particularly if it 
is a power law or not, depend on the properties of the upper tail of the distribution of 
skills. 
5.1 Average size of firms and labor productivity of the economy 
Since the average size of firms and output per occupied individual are endogenous 
variables, the correlation between the two must be the result of changes of the sign in the 
values of the two variables, from changes in the values of the exogenous parameters of 
the model. The comparative static analysis cannot be performed analytically, because the 
equations that characterize the equilibrium (expressions [A3]-[A5] in Appendix A) have 
no closed-form solution and are too complex6. Therefore, we have calculated numerically 
the sign of the derivatives of the endogenous variables of the model for 20,000 
6 Suppose, for example, that we want to analyse the effect of parameter  on total output, TYT*. The 
analytical expression of the derivative of TYT*with respect to  (computed with the software Wolfram 
Mathematica) has thousands of terms, which have different signs and depend on seven exogenous 
parameters and three endogenous variables. It is humanly impossible to prove whether the sign of this 
derivative is positive or negative. 
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configurations of reasonable values of the parameters: a from 3 to 100, β from 0 to 0.5, b 
from 0 to 3, c from 0.01 to 0.20, and µ from 0.5 to 0.9. 
Table 3 shows a sample of the results obtained from numerical calculations around the 
combination of parameter values calibrated with Spanish data. In particular, each row in 
Table 3 shows the percentage change in the selected endogenous variables resulting from 
a 1 percentage point change in the values of the parameter (columns) keeping the 
remaining parameters at their base values (elasticity). For example, the first number in 
the table, 3.13%, is the percentage increase in the number of solo entrepreneurs when the 
value of parameter β increases by 1% (from 0.36 in the base model to 0.3636). The 
calculations of the derivatives for the 20,000 configurations of the parameters all confirm 
the signs in Table 3. 
In addition, we have solved for a closed solution of the average size of firms and total 
output produced in the simple case of no capital input, only employers and employees, 
and Pareto distribution of skills, and have analytically performed comparative static 
analysis of changes of the two variables to changes of the exogenous parameters, 
primarily a and β. The analytical comparative static results of this simplified model also 
confirm the signs shown in Table 3, for the reduced set of exogenous parameters. 
The endogenous values of sizes of occupational groups, output, and sizes of firms, are 
highly sensitive to changes in organizational size diseconomies, β, and to the concentration 
of skills in the Pareto distribution, a. Higher β, and higher a, each separately, reduce the 
total output produced (labor productivity), increase the number of firms, lower their 
average size, and reduce the number of individuals occupied in large firms. Table 3 shows 
that, for practically all the exogenous parameters, the sign of the variation in output from 
increasing the value of one of them is the same as the sign of the variation in the chosen 
measure of size of the firms. The only exception is the increase in b, the lower bound in 
the distribution of skills that causes an increase in output and a decrease in the average size 
of firms with employees. This means that the empirical evidence showing a positive 
association in cross-country data between average sizes of firms and average productivity 
(output per occupied individual) can be generated by cross-country differences in the 
values of one or several of the exogenous parameters of the model. 
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(TABLE 3) 
 
In this respect, the IMF and OECD repeatedly include, in their reports on the Spanish 
economy, the recommendation of increasing average size of firms as a way of increasing 
average labor productivity in the Spanish economy. Currently, GDP per hour worked in 
Spain is 85% of that of Germany and 78% of the GDP per hour in the US (OECD). From 
the market equilibrium, calculated with the calibrated values of the parameters for Spain, 
to approximately double the number of employees per entrepreneur-manager, average size 
of firms when the firm is defined as a management unit, from the current value of 9.5 
employees to 20, the value of β = 0.36 would have to be reduced to β = 0.312 (all other 
parameters being equal). With the lower value of the organization size diseconomies 
parameter, the total output produced, the average labor productivity of the economy in the 
context of the model, would increase by 17%. 
 
The average size of firms is also very sensitive to the concentration of the distribution of 
entrepreneurial skills, parameter a. To double the average size of firms with employees, 
20 employees per employer-manager, the value of the parameter a must change from the 
actual value of a = 4.78 to a = 4.14 (all other parameters being equal). The total output 
produced, average productivity, would increase by 55%. Lower values of the parameter a 
imply more individuals in the upper tail of the distribution of entrepreneurial skills (greater 
dispersion in the population); in this case, with a = 4.14 the average skills of entrepreneurs 
in the top 1% of the distribution increases with respect to the current average, as do the 
sizes and productivity of the firms they manage. 
 
Table 3 also shows the sensitivity of the sizes of occupational groups of solo 
entrepreneurs and entrepreneur-managers to changes in the exogenous parameters. The 
relative sizes of both groups change in the same direction in response to changes in the 
values of parameters β and a. However, changes in the values of the lower bound of the 
distribution of skills, b, the cost of capital, c, the intensity of labor in production, µ, the 
elasticity of substitution between direct labor and capital, ρ, and the general TFP of the 
economy, θ, all give opposite signs of the resulting changes in the equilibrium proportions 
of solo entrepreneurs and entrepreneur-managers, with the values being higher for the 
solo entrepreneurs. This is both an additional justification of why the two groups of 
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entrepreneurs should be treated separately, and an explanation of why the two can show 
different signs in the correlations with the GDP per capita of countries. 
5.2 Size of firm and TFP 
A generally accepted economic premise is that market competition will force inefficient 
firms out of the market and all surviving ones will then converge to similar levels of 
productivity and costs. However, the empirical evidence seems contrary to this prediction 
and significant differences in productivity, labor and TFP, persist among firms, even in 
the same industry (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Syverson, 2011). One common explanation 
of the observed heterogeneity in the productivity of firms is that inefficient entrepreneurs 
combined with market distortions, such as taxes on the use of inputs, and regulations, lead 
to misallocations of production resources (Banerjee and Duflo, 2005; Restuccia and 
Rogerson, 2008; Guner et al., 2008; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009). 
Result 1.e) and equation (18), according to which the distribution of TFP of firms is a 
linear transformation ( e) of the left-truncated distribution of entrepreneurial skills in the 
population (truncated at e2), provide an alternative explanation to the heterogeneity 
observed in TFP: firms differ in TFP because they are managed by entrepreneurs of 
different entrepreneurial skills. The persistent heterogeneity in the TFP of firms 
associated with differences in the entrepreneurial skills of their entrepreneurs-managers 
is compatible with intense competition in the product markets and with output-
maximizing allocations of resource inputs within a firm and across firms. 
Differences in the quality of entrepreneurial skills among entrepreneurs are difficult to 
observe empirically, but one reasonable assumption is that the level of skills will go hand-
in-hand with how well firms are actually managed. Recent research has documented 
substantial differences in the quality of management of firms around the world, both 
within countries and across countries (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007). Follow-up research 
with the same database also shows that quality of management is positively correlated 
with the size of the firm, and that higher quality has a positive effect on the TFP of firms 
(Bloom et al., 2014). 
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In the market equilibrium from occupational choices, individuals in the upper tail of the 
distribution of skills will choose to work as entrepreneur-managers and, from equations 
(10) and (11), within this occupational group, those with higher skills will employ a 
greater volume of inputs, labor, and capital, and will produce more output than firms with 
less-skilled managers. Finally, from Result 1.e) and the discussion in section 5.1, we 
know that the distribution of TFP of firms matches an increasing transformation of the 
distribution of skills of their entrepreneur-managers. Therefore, the results of the model 
explain the positive association between the size of the firm and its TFP as the 
consequence of, first, that the entrepreneurs of higher skills command a larger volume of 
resources in the market equilibrium; and, second, the level of skills of the entrepreneur-
manager directly determines the TFP of the firm. 
Moral-Benito (2016), with data from individual Spanish firms, confirms that the 
estimated TFP of firms in the sample increases with their size, in line with evidence found 
in other studies with firms from other countries. From Moral-Benito (2016, Table 2), the 
average TFP of small, medium, and large firms, relative to the average TFP of micro 
firms are 1.6, 2.5, and 5.7, respectively. With the distribution of equation (18) and the 
calibrated values of the parameters, the estimated average TFP of solo entrepreneurs, 
micro, small, medium, and large firms, are 0.77, 1 (normalized value), 1.5, 2.4, and 4, 
respectively. The predicted average values of TFP of the size classes are very much in 
line with the estimations of Moral-Benito (2016) with real data from Spanish firms7. 
5.3 Power laws and the missing middle in the distribution of firm sizes 
There are two regularities in the empirical data on distribution of firm sizes that are often 
highlighted in research and policy analysis: first, the density of the distribution of firm 
sizes is a decreasing and convex function of the value of the size variable (for example, 
number of employees). Second, the proportions of occupied persons in the size classes of 
small and large firms are greater than the proportion of the occupied in middle-sized 
7 Hsieh and Klenow (2009) find that their estimated TFP for the firm in the 90th percentile of the size 
distribution of plants in the United States is 8.8 times the TFP estimated for the plant in the 10th percentile 
(22.4 for India and 11.5 for China). It is much higher than the ratio estimated here, 1.7, although in the 
calculations they assume constant returns to scale, while in our model, returns to scale are decreasing. 
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firms. A simple observation confirms that the Spanish data in Table 2 shares these 
regularities. 
 
The decreasing and convex with size density of the distribution of firms has led to the 
inclusion of the variable size of the firm in the class of economic variables that belong to 
the family of power laws (Axtell, 2001; Gabaix, 2016). The greater concentration of 
occupied individuals at the extremes of the distribution has been referred to as the 
“missing middle” (Hsieh and Olken, 2014). In this section, we reconcile these regularities 
with the predictions from occupational choice models. 
 
A random variable x follows a power law distribution if the elasticity of the probability 
of the value of the variable being higher or equal than x, to the value of x, is constant for 
all x (Gabaix, 2016). In the context of this paper, x is the size (number of employees, L) 
of the firm. The Pareto and the Zipf distributions satisfy the condition of constant 
elasticity; in fact, the Zipf distribution is considered a special case of Pareto distribution 
with elasticity equal to one. The density functions of power law distributions are 
decreasing and convex with the value of the random variable. 
 
The theoretical distribution of firm sizes derived from the occupational choice model in 
Section 3 is a Pareto distribution expressed by equation (15): 
 
, for  
 
Figure 2 shows the representation of the cumulative distribution (left) and the density 
functions (right) of firm sizes, from the values of the parameters calibrated with Spanish 
data (a = 4.78 and β = 0.36) and power parameter a β/(1 + β) = 1.265. 
 
Axtell (2001) studies the distribution of firm sizes in the US with census data and 
empirically estimates a power parameter value of 1.059. Then, Axtell concludes that the 
distribution of firm sizes in the US unequivocally follows a Zipf distribution (power 
parameter equal to one). The power parameter of the distribution of firm sizes in the US, 
1.059, is then lower than the one inferred from the calibrated values of the parameters for 
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the distribution of Spanish firms, 1.265. Figure 3 shows the Zipf-plot distributions of firm 
size, , as a function of , for the values of the power parameter 
1.059, US, and 1.265, Spain. A steeper slope in absolute value implies size distributions 
with a greater density of firms in the lower tail of the distribution and, therefore, 
distribution of firms of smaller average size. The Zipf-plots confirm that firm sizes in 
Spain are smaller than in the US. From the parameters that determine the values of the 
power parameters, the differences in firm size for the two countries can be explained by 
greater organizational size diseconomies and/or higher concentration of distribution of 
skills in Spain than in the US. 
The empirical evidence lets Axtell (2001, p. 1818) to the conclusion that “the Zipf 
distribution of firm sizes is a target that any empirically-accurate theory of the firm must 
hit”. The model of production and organization of firms, where entrepreneurs provide 
inputs in the form of quality of strategic decisions and supervision of the use of direct 
inputs - labor and capital at the job level - together with a competitive market allocation 
of entrepreneurial skills through occupational choices, responds to the Axtell request. 
Moreover, the occupational choice models provide additional insights into the origin of 
the empirical regularity in the density of firm sizes. 
From the theory in Section 2.5, the distribution of firm sizes is a power transformation of 
the left-truncated distribution of entrepreneurial skills in the population (truncated at e2). 
Since the distribution of skills is a Pareto-distribution, and has the property of a power 
law, the distribution of firm sizes will also be a power law with a different power 
parameter than the distribution of skills. But, what if the distribution of skills were normal 
or lognormal? The equilibrium from occupational choice implies that all individuals 
working as entrepreneur-managers will be drawn from the upper tail of the distribution 
of skills, and that the number of employees under the direction of each entrepreneur-
manager will increase with skills. The theoretical distribution of firm sizes will be a power 
function of the (truncated) upper tail of the normal or lognormal distribution of skills, but 
it will not be strictly a power law because the lognormal and normal distributions do not 
share the property of the power laws (constant power parameter). In a purely empirical 
approach, although the distribution of skills is not a power law, the density of firm sizes 
 %ln 1 firms L     ln L
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will continue to be a convex and decreasing function of size (number of employees) and 
the statistical fit of the Zipf plot to the data will most likely assure a high R2. 
The point to bear in mind is that, for many distributions of skills, the empirical, observed 
distribution of firm sizes will be decreasing and convex with size, so it is most likely that 
the fit of the Zipf-plot to the data will give a high R2 in the statistical estimation, 
independently of whether the empirical data come from values of a true theoretical 
distribution of firm sizes, or not. The theories of the firm should not be subordinated to 
the presumption that the distribution of firm sizes follows a power law. Rather, the theory 
should guide the empirical research in identifying the conditions under which the 
hypothesis of the constant power parameter of the distribution is consistent with the 
theoretical model, and when it is not. 
The missing middle 
The dashed lines in Figure 2 show the distribution and density functions of employees as 
a function of the size of firms (number of employees), obtained from equation (16), and 
the values of the parameters calibrated from Spanish data. The distribution of employees 
also follows a power law with power parameter [β (a 1) 1]/(1 + β) = 0.265, i.e. the 
power parameter of the distribution of firm sizes minus one (Results 1.b) and 1.c) above). 
The density function of employees as a function of the size of the firm is then convex and 
always decreasing with size. Since the power parameter of the distribution of firms is 
higher than that of the distribution of employees, the density function of firms will be 
more convex than the density of employees, and the two density functions will intersect 
in a certain size value (close to 10 employees in this case). 
The convex and smoothly decreasing density function of employees as a function of the 
size of the firm, contrasts with the evidence of Table 2 on the proportion of occupied in 
micro, small, medium, and large firms, decreasing from the micro to the medium sizes 
and increasing again in the class of large firms. This pattern of distribution of occupied 
individuals with high concentration in the size classes of micro and large firms, and low 
concentration of the occupied in mid-sized firms, repeats in distributions of firms in all 
countries and has been named the “missing middle”. The missing middle has been 
attributed to the difficulty of micro and small firms to grow because of the lack of 
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financial and other critical resources, and/or to incremental costs from complying with 
firm-size-dependent regulations applied to firms when they reach a certain size, for 
example 50 employees (Tybout, 2000; Kruger, 2013; Hsieh and Olken, 2014). 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of employees as a function of size of the firm together 
with the representation of the proportions of employees in the size classes of 1-9 
employees (micro), 10-49 employees (small), 50 to 249 employees (medium), and more 
than 249 employees (large). The figure confirms that there is no contradiction at all 
between the continuous decreasing density function of employees as a function of size, 
and the U-shaped representation of proportions of the occupied in classes of size of firms 
in Table 2. It all has to do with the way the bounds have been chosen to define the size 
classes, and the convexity of the continuous density function. Inferences on size- 
dependent obstacles to growth, and follow up of firm-size dependent policies to remove 
them from the comparatively low proportion of employment and activity in mid-sized 
firms, as defined in official statistics on the distribution of firm sizes, can then be 
misleading. 
6. CONCLUSION
Empirical evidence such that i) average sizes of firms are positively correlated with per 
capita income of countries (Bento and Restuccia, 2016), and ii) that, within a country, 
larger firms are more productive, in terms of TFP, than small ones (Hsieh and Klenov, 
2009, 2014; Moral-Benito, 2016), make the size of firms an important policy variable 
(OECD, 2014; IMF, 2015). Models such as the one presented in this paper make clear 
that the size of firms, their respective productivity, and the average productivity and size 
aggregated for the whole economy, are all endogenous variables that result from 
competition pressures among individuals, who make occupational choices of working as 
employees, solo entrepreneurs, or entrepreneur-managers. Firm-size-dependent policies 
per se, i.e. those that make increasing the sizes of firms a direct policy target, will not be 
effective in reaching the goal of increasing productivity and per capita income of 
countries if the underlying determinants of the distribution of firm sizes remain intact. 
Since self-employment is also used as an indicator of entrepreneurship, and proportions 
of solo self-employed and employers are endogenously determined, some of the 
conclusions from the paper can also illustrate and inform the debate around whether and 
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when entrepreneurship contributes to economic development (Parker, 2009; Shane, 2009; 
van Praag and van Stel, 2013). 
 
Occupational choice models offer a conceptual framework to examine the determinants 
of firm sizes and productivity and, therefore, identify possible policy targets among the 
factors that ultimately lead to the observed sizes of firms. In particular, the model 
presented here points to factors whose differences across countries can explain 
differences in the average size of firms and labor productivity: i) the properties of the 
distribution of entrepreneurial skills in the population; ii) the properties of the 
representative production technology (degree of technical scale economies and capital 
intensity, elasticity of substitution between labor and capital, general level of operating 
efficiency common to all firms); iii) the internal organization of firms, for example the 
efficient delegation of decision power in hierarchical organizations; and iv) the cost of 
capital. Among these factors, the preliminary comparative static results presented in this 
paper suggest that the equilibrium distribution of firm sizes is particularly sensitive to the 
values of the parameters of dispersion in the distribution of skills, and the degree of 
organizational size diseconomies. Prior research, mainly empirical, has focused on 
environmental, political, and institutional forces to explain differences in the size 
distribution of firms across countries (Davis and Henrekson, 1999; Kumar et al., 1999). 
However, the two factors highlighted here, the distribution of skills and the internal 
organization of firms, have been overlooked. 
 
Prior research has demonstrated the usefulness of occupational choice models to evaluate 
the social costs and benefits of market frictions resulting from taxes and minimum wages 
(Medrano-Adán et al., 2015); firm-size dependent policies that unintentionally increase 
the external cost of growth of firms (Garicano et al., 2016), and discriminatorily tax 
capital and/or labor (Guner et al., 2008). Public policies can alter the distribution of 
entrepreneurial skills through immigration laws and through education systems that foster 
diversity and experimentation. The internal costs of growth of firms are lower when trust 
reduces agency costs, and when the individuals in lower hierarchical ranks have the skills 
demanded by the more complex problems they will face after the delegation. Combining 
policies in these directions, education for diversity, and trust enforcement, and with well-
functioning markets for the control of productive resources, which, in turn, facilitate 
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skilled management teams who can effectively manage more resources than less-skilled 
ones, should contribute gradually to higher productivity and social welfare. 
The repeated shape of a decreasing and convex density function of firm size in empirical 
studies has led to the inclusion of firm size as an economic variable whose behavior is 
described by a power law (Gabaix, 2016). Moreover, the reiteration in the empirical 
regularity has been used to justify the assertion that theories of the firm should take the 
power law distribution of firm size as a target to fit (Axtell, 2001). A similar argument 
could be used to say that firm-size dependent policies should be constrained by the fact 
that the distribution of firm size is a power law. Our analysis provides theoretical 
conditions under which the size distribution of firms can be represented by a power law. 
The relatively strict conditions contrast with the generalized empirical evidence, across 
countries, of distributions of firm size, decreasing and convex with size, that suggest that 
the power law is universal. The apparent contradiction is resolved in knowing that the 
true distribution of firm size corresponds to a monotonic transformation of the (truncated) 
upper-tail of the distribution of entrepreneurial skills in the population. If the monotonic 
transformation is a power function, and the distribution of skills is a power law, then 
distributions of firm size will be a conditioned power law. Otherwise, the power law will 
be an approximation, generally a good approximation, in terms of statistical goodness of 
fit, of a general distribution. 
Empirical regularities such as the power law shape of the distribution of firm size, and 
the relatively low concentration of occupation and activity in small and mid-sized firms, 
compared with concentration in micro and large firms per se, as identified in the official 
statistics on firm sizes, say nothing about potential market frictions that increase the cost 
of growth of firms, and/or impose obstacles to higher labor productivity. A theory of the 
determinants of the distribution of firm sizes and TFP in friction-free markets provides a 
benchmark from which to define public policies that target the educational, technological, 
and management practices that can change the size distribution of firms in the same 
direction, as the economy becomes more productive. 
REFERENCES 
Axtell, R. (2001). “Zipf Distributions of US Firm Sizes”. Science, 293(5536), 
1818−1820. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1062081 
  36
Banco de España (2014). Central de Balances 2013. Resultados anuales de las empresas 
no financieras, Banco de España, Madrid. 
Banerjee, A., and Duflo, E., (2005). “Growth Theory through the Lens of Development 
Economics”, In P. Aghion and S. N. Durlauf (eds.), Handbook of Economic 
Growth, Volume 1A, Chap. 7, pp. 453—572. Elsevier BV. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S1574-0684(05)01007-5 
Bento, P., and Restuccia, D. (2016). Misallocation, Establishment Size and Productivity. 
NBER Working Paper No. 22809. https://doi.org/10.3386/w22809 
Blanchflower, D. (2004). “Self-employment: More May not Be Better”. Swedish 
Economic Policy Review, 11(2), 15–73. 
Blau, D. M., 1987, “A Time-Series Analysis of Self- Employment in the United States”. 
Journal of Political Economy, 95(3), 445–467. https://doi.org/10.1086/261466 
Bloom, N., and Van Reenen, J. (2007). “Measuring and Explaining Management 
Practices across Firms and Countries”. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(4), 
1351–1408. https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2007.122.4.1351 
Bloom, N., Lemos, R., Sadun, R., Scur, D., and Van Reenen, J. (2014). “The New 
Empirical Economics of Management”. Journal of the European Economic 
Association, 12(4), 835–876. https://doi.org/10.1111/jeea.12094 
Bosma, N., Jones, K., Autio, E., and Levie, J. (2008). Global Entrepreneurship Monitor: 
2007 Executive Report. Wellesley, MA: Babson College and London: London 
Business School. 
Branstetter, L., Lima, F., Taylor, L., and Venâncio, A. (2014). “Do Entry Regulations 
Deter Entrepreneurship and Job Creation? Evidence from Recent Reforms in 
Portugal”. Economic Journal, 124(577), 805–832. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12044 
Calvo, G., and Wellisz, S. (1980). “Technology, Entrepreneurs and Firm Size”. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 95(4), 663–678. https://doi.org/10.2307/1885486 
Carree, M., van Stel, A., Thurik, R., and Wennekers, S. (2007). “The Relationship 
Between Economic Development and Business Ownership Revisited”. 
Entrepreneurship and Regional Development, 19(3), 281–291. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08985620701296318 
Carree, M., van Stel, A., Thurik, R., and Wennekers, S. (2002). “Economic Development 
and Business Ownership: An Analysis Using Data of 23 OECD Countries in the 
Period 1976–1996”. Small Business Economics, 19(3), 271–290. 
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1019604426387 
Davis, S.J., and Henrekson, M. (1999). “Explaining National Differences in the Size and 
Industry Distribution of Employment”. Small Business Economics, 12(1) 59–83. 
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008078130748 
Gabaix, X. (2016) “Power Laws in Economics: An Introduction”. Journal of Economic 
37
Perspectives, 30(1), 185–206. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.30.1.185 
Garicano, L. (2000). “Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production”. 
Journal of Political Economy, 108(5), 874–904. https://doi.org/10.1086/317671 
Garicano, L., and Rossi-Hansberg, E. (2006). “Organization and Inequality in a 
Knowledge Economy”. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(4), 1383–1435. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/121.4.1383 
Garicano, L., Lelarge, C., Van Reenen, J. (2016). “Firm Size Distortions and the 
Productivity Distribution: Evidence from France”, American Economic Review, 
106 (11), 3439–3479. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20130232 
Gollin, D. (2008). “Nobody’s Business but My Own: Self-employment and Small 
Enterprise in Economic Development”. Journal of Monetary Economics, 55(2), 
219–233. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2007.11.003 
Guner, N., Ventura, G., and Xu, Y. (2008). “Macroeconomic Implications of Size-
Dependent Policies”. Review of Economic Dynamics, 11(4), 721–744. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2008.01.005 
Gur, N. and Bjornskov, Ch. (2016) “Trust and Delegation: Theory and evidence”.   
Journal of Comparative Economics doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2016.02.002 
Henrekson, M., and Johansson, D. (1999) “Institutional Effects on the Evolution of the 
Size Distribution of Firms”, Small Business Economics, 12(1), 11–23. 
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008002330051 
Hopenhayn, H. (1992). “Entry, Exit, and Firm Dynamics in Long Run Equilibrium”. 
Econometrica, 60(5), 1127–1150. https://doi.org/10.2307/2951541 
Hsieh, Ch., and Klenow, P. (2009). “Misallocation and Manufacturing TFP in China and 
India”. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(4), 1403–1448. 
https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2009.124.4.1403 
Hsieh, Ch., and Klenow, P. (2014). “The Life Cycle of Plants in India and Mexico”. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(3), 1035–1084. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qju014 
Hsieh, Ch., and Olken, B. (2014). “The Missing ‘Missing Middle’”. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 28(3), 89–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.28.3.89 
Idson, T., and Oi, W. (1999). “Workers Are More Productive in Large Firms”. American 
Economic Review, 89(2), 104–108. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.89.2.104 
IMF (2015), “Obstacles to firm growth in Spain”. In Spain. Selected Issues. IMF Country 
Report No. 15/233. August 2015. International Monetary Fund Washington, D.C. 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/cr15233.pdf 
Jovanovic, B. (1982). “Selection and the Evolution of Industry”. Econometrica, 50(3), 
649–670. https://doi.org/10.2307/1912606 
  38
Jovanovic, B. (1994). “Firm Formation with Heterogeneous Management and Labor 
Skills”. Small Business Economics, 6(3), 185–191. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01108287 
Kihlstrom, R., and Laffont, J. (1979). “A General Equilibrium Entrepreneurial Theory of 
Firm Formation Based on Risk Aversion”. Journal of Political Economy, 87(4), 
719–749. https://doi.org/10.1086/260790 
Krueger, A.O. (2013). “The Missing Middle”. In N.C. Hope, A. Kochar, R. Noll and T.N. 
Srinivasan (Eds.) Economic Reform in India: Challenges, Prospects, and Lessons, 
pp. 299–318. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kumar, K., Rajan, R., and Zingales, L. (1999). What Determines Firm Size? NBER 
Working Paper No. 7208. https://doi.org/10.3386/w7208 
Lucas, R. (1978). “On the Size Distribution of Business Firms”. The Bell Journal of 
Economics, 9(2), 508–523. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003596 
Medrano-Adán, L., Salas-Fumás, V., and Sanchez-Asin, J.J. (2015) “Heterogeneous 
Entrepreneurs from Occupational Choices in Economies with Minimum Wage”. 
Small Business Economics, 44(3), 597−619. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-014-
9610-4 
Ministerio de Industria, Energía y Turismo (2014). Retrato de las PYME 2013. MIET, 
Dirección General de Industria y de la Pequeña y Mediana Empresa, Madrid. 
Moral-Benito, E. (2016). Growing by Learning: Firm Level Evidence on the Size-
Productivity Nexus, Banco de España, D.T. No. 1613. 
http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SES/Secciones/Publicaciones/PublicacionesSeriada
s/DocumentosTrabajo/16/Fich/dt1613e.pdf 
OECD (2014). “Moving towards a more dynamic business sector in Spain”. In OECD 
Economic Surveys: Spain 2014, pp. 105−146. OECD Publishing. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/eco_surveys-esp-2014-en 
Onji, K. (2009). “The Response of Firms to Eligibility Thresholds: Evidence from the 
Japanese Value-Added Tax”. Journal of Public Economics, 93(5–6), 766–775. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.12.003 
Parker, S. (2009). The Economics of Entrepreneurship, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Penrose, E. T. (1959). Theory of the Growth of the Firm, J. Wiley & Sons, New York. 
Restuccia, D., and Rogerson, R. (2008). “Policy Distortions and Aggregate Productivity 
with Heterogeneous Plants”. Review of Economic Dynamics, 11(4), 707–720. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2008.05.002 
Rosen, S. (1982). “Authority, Control, and the Distribution of Earnings”. The Bell 
Journal of Economics, 13(2), 311–323. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003456 
Salas-Fumás, V., Sanchez-Asin, J.J., and Storey, D. (2014). “Occupational Choice, 
39
Number of Entrepreneurs and Output: Theory and Empirical Evidence with 
Spanish Data”. Series, Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, 5(1), 1–24. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13209-013-0103-5 
Schivardi, F., and Torrini, R. (2008). “Identifying the Effects of Firing Restrictions 
through Size-Contingent Differences in Regulation”. Labour Economics, 15(3), 
482–511. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2007.03.003 
Shane, S. (2009). “Why Encouraging More People to Become Entrepreneurs is Bad 
Public Policy”. Small Business Economics, 33(2), 141–149. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-009-9215-5 
Syverson, Ch. (2011). “What Determines Productivity?” Journal of Economic Literature, 
49(2), 326–365. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.49.2.326 
Tybout, J.R. (2000). “Manufacturing Firms in Developing Countries: How Well Do They 
Do, and Why?” Journal of Economic Literature, 38(1), 11–44. 
https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.38.1.11 
Van Praag, M., and van Stel, A. (2013). “The More Business Owners, the Merrier? The 
Role of Tertiary Education”. Small Business Economics, 41(2), 335–357. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-012-9436-x 
40
Appendix A 
The market equilibrium solution 
From the main text, in the market equilibrium: 
i. Each agent makes the occupational choice (employee, solo entrepreneur, or
employer-manager) that results in a higher “rent”.
ii. Aggregate labor demand equals aggregate labor supply (this condition determines
the equilibrium wage).
Both conditions are interrelated. The occupational choice depends on the wage that is set 
in the labor market, and the labor supply and demand depend on the individual 
occupational choices. 
For a given wage w, the occupational choice of an individual with entrepreneurial skills 
e may be written as: 
where Π(e) and R(e) are, respectively, the net revenues of the solo entrepreneur and the 
profits of employers, as functions of her respective level of skill, equations (9) and (11) 
in the main text. There exist two levels of skill e1 and e2 (see Figure 1) such that 
[A1] 
and 
[A2] 
Individuals with skills e < e1 will choose to work as employees, individuals with skills e1 
< e < e2 will prefer to be solo entrepreneurs, and individuals with skills e > e2 will become 
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employer-managers. e1 is the level of entrepreneurial skill of the (unique) individual who 
is indifferent between working as an employee and becoming a solo entrepreneur. 
Analogously, e2 is the level of entrepreneurial skills of the (unique) individual who is 
indifferent between becoming a solo entrepreneur and working as an employer-manager. 
The occupational choices determine the aggregate labor supply  
*1 ( )
( )
e w
b
S w d e  , and
the aggregate labor demand    
2
*
( *)
( ) ; ,
e w
D w L e w c d e

  ). In equilibrium the two must 
be equal, so the market equilibrium conditions are given by the three equations: 
where L(e, w, c), Π(e) and R(e) are given by (10), (11) and (9) in the main text, and Γ(e) 
is the Pareto-cumulative distribution function with parameters (a, b). After substituting 
these equations (demand for employees, profits of employers and revenues of the solo 
self-employed), and doing some calculations, we obtain the following system of 
equations in (e1, e2, w) that characterize the equilibrium: 
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 [A5] 
There is no closed-form solution to this non-linear system of equations. Although these 
equations are complex, we can prove existence and uniqueness 8  of equilibrium, 
provided that the necessary condition  is satisfied, and we can solve them 
numerically, implicitly defining the equilibrium values of e1, e2, and w as functions of the 
7 exogenous parameters 
* * *
1 2( , ,  , , ,  ,  ), ( , ,  , , ,  ,  ),   and   ( , ,  , , ,  ,  )e c a b e c a b w c a b            . 
Alternatively, we can express the equilibrium values of w and e2 as functions of e1, and 
then find the equilibrium value of e1 by solving a single equation. Proceeding in this way, 
the equilibrium value of w (as a function of e1) is directly given by [A9] and the 
equilibrium value of e2 is given by: 
[A6] 
where . 
Finally, the equilibrium value of e1 is given by the unique9  solution to the following 
equation that satisfies conditions b ≤ e1 ≤ e2, and w ≥ 0: 
8 The proof is available upon request. 
9 In general, this equation has two positive solutions, but the largest one is not an equilibrium since the 
corresponding values of e2 and w do not satisfy the necessary conditions b ≤ e1 ≤ e2, and w ≥ 0. 
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 [A7] 
where, 
<0, >0, >0, 
 > 0, < 0, >0, and 
This equation has no closed-form solution but can be solved numerically, implicitly 
defining the equilibrium value of e1 as a function of the exogenous parameters 
 
Once the equilibrium value of e1 is found, it is straightforward to obtain the equilibrium 
wage, the equilibrium value of e2, and any other endogenous variable (labor supply, 
equilibrium number of employees, and so on). 
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Appendix B 
Calibration of the parameters of the model 
The exogenous parameters of the model are . In the main text, we 
justify the initial values for parameters c = 0.12, θ = 1, ρ = 0.5 (σ = 2/3) and µ = 0.75. 
Therefore, we have parameters a, b, and β remaining for calibration. For the calibration, 
we use information on the proportions of those employed as employees and as employers 
plus managers, together with information on the proportion of those occupied in firms 
with 250 employees or more, and the market equilibrium conditions of the model: 
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where Lmin = L(w; e2) is given in result 1.b, and w, e1 and e2 are given by the market 
equilibrium conditions, equations [A3] to [A5] of Appendix A. Substituting Lmin the 
complete system of equations is:  
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After substituting θ = 1, c = 0.12, μ = 0.75 and ρ = 0.5 into these equations, we obtain the 
following equations system on six unknowns: e1, e2, w, a, b and β. 
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The numerical solution to this system of equations provides the calibrated values of the 
parameters of the model, as well as the values of the other endogenous variables: β = 0.36, 
a = 4.775, b = 3.269, w = 5.52, e1 = 4.53 and e2 = 5.48. 
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TABLES 
Table 1.- Actual size of occupational groups: Spanish non-agricultural market economy 
Employees Employers Managers Solo entrepreneurs Total 
Year 2013 
Number 
(thousand) 10,250 850 350 1,750 13,200 
Percentage 77.80% 6.40% 2.60% 13.20% 100% 
Year 2005 
Number 
(thousand) 11,100 885 270 1,700 13,955 
Percentage 79.54% 6.34% 1.93% 12.18% 100% 
Source: Own elaboration from INE-EPA 
Table 2. Distribution of firms with employees and occupied individuals: Observed proportions 
and proportions predicted from the model 
Percentage of firms over the total number of firms with salaried employees (1) 
Sizes (by # employees) 1 to 9 (Micro) 
10 to 49 
(Small) 
50 to 249 
(Medium) 
More than 249 
(Large) Total 
Observed data in 2013 90.70% 7.77% 1.30% 0.26% 100% 
Observed data in 2005 87.71% 10.48% 1.54% 0.27% 100% 
Predicted data (by the model) 87.40% 10.95% 1.43% 0.22% 100% 
Percentage of occupied individuals in firms with salaried employees (2) 
Sizes (by # employees) 1 to 9 (Micro) 
10 to 49 
(Small) 
50 to 249 
(Medium) 
More than 249 
(Large) Total 
Observed data in 2013 40.70% 19.25% 13.51% 26.16% 100% 
Observed data in 2009 40.60% 21.30% 14.1% 24.00% 100% 
Predicted data (by the model) 40.30% 21.30% 13.40% 25.00% 100% 
1. The number of firms with employees in 2005 and 2013 is 1.5 million.
2. The number of individuals occupied in firms with employees (employees, managers, and employed) is 12.3 million
in 2009 and 11.4 million in 2013. 
Source: Observed: Ministerio de Industria, Energía y Turismo (2014); OECD (2015). Predicted: simulation results 
with parameter values: c = 0.12, θ = 1, μ = 0.75, ρ = 0.5, β = 0.36, a = 4.78, b = 3.27. 
48
Table 3. Comparative static analysis: Each number is the percent change in the value of the 
endogenous variable resulting from a one-percent change in the value of the respective parameter. 
Organization 
Distribution of skills Cost of 
Capital 
Elasticity 
Labor 
Elasticity 
Substitution 
General 
Productivity Lower bound 
Dispersion 
(Inverse) 
β b a c µ ρ θ 
Entrepreneurs 
Solo 3.13 −2.61 6.97 −0.32 −3.92 −0.46 0.32 
Managers 3.49 0.75 1.89 0.13 0.95 0.09 −0.13 
Output 
Total −0.72 1.39 −1.95 −0.06 −0.97 −0.13 1.06 
Per firm with 
employees −4.56 0.95 −4.72 −0.16 −1.47 −0.16 1.16 
Sizes of firms 
Average 
employees 
per firm 
−4.38 −0.42 −3.25 −0.10 −0.45 −0.02 0.10 
Lmin −1.64 −0.42 0.45 −0.10 −0.45 −0.02 0.10 
Firms with L 
> 50 −5.12 −0.53 −3.55 −0.12 −0.56 −0.03 0.12 
Occupied in 
firms with 
L > 249 
−5.86 0.21 −7.40 0.01 0.39 0.06 −0.01 
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FIGURES 
Figure 1. Market equilibrium: In the left figure, the salary of employees (dot-dashed line), the profits of 
employer-managers (dashed line), and income (solid line) of solo entrepreneurs as a function of the level 
of skills. In the right figure, the market equilibrium from the supply (dashed line) and the demand 
(continuous line) of/for employees as a function of market salary. The equilibrium point (L*, w*) gives the 
proportion of individuals working as employees from the distribution of skills, 0.79, and the equilibrium 
wage, w* = 5.52. Values of exogenous parameters: θ = 1, c = 0.12, μ = 0.75, ρ = 0.5, a = 4.775, b = 3.269, 
and β = 0.36. 
Figure 2. Cumulative (left) and density (right) functions of number of firms (continuous line) and of 
number of employees (dashed line), as a function of the number of employees: calibrated values of 
parameters as in Figure 1. 
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Figure 3. The Zipf - plots of the distribution of firm sizes in the Spanish economy (solid line) and in the 
US economy (dashed line). For each number of employees L, it represents the proportion of firms with L 
or more employees, 1‒ Γ%firms (L), with log scales. The values of the power parameters are 1.265 for Spain 
and 1.059 for the US. 
Figure 4. Distribution of occupied persons as a function of the size of the firm (number of employees) in 
Spain, and proportions of occupied persons in micro, small, medium, and large firms in Spain (Table 2). 
Calibrated values of the parameters as in Figure 1. 
Ln(1‒Γ%firms (L)) 
Employees 
(L) 
Size 
(L) 
MICRO 
SMALL 
MEDIUM 
LARGE 
